[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
of assimilations and complications that leads to the success processes, is still more clearly
marked. Thus, the recognition of an object that has often been perceived is easier and,
therefore, as a rule an instantaneous process, which is also more like the ordinary
assimilation because the feeling of familiarity is much less intense. Sensible cognition
differs, generally but little from the recognition of single familiar objects. The logical
distinction between the two concepts consist in the fact that recognition means the
establishment of individual identity of the newly perceived with a formerly perceived
object, while cognition is the subsumption of object under a familiar concept. Still, there
is no real logical subsumption in a process of sensible cognition any more there is a fully
developed class-concept under which the subsumption could be made. The psychological
equivalent of such a subsumption is to be found in this case in the process of relating the
impression in question to an indefinitely large number of objects. This presupposes an
earlier perception of various objects which agree only in certain particular properties, so
that the process of cognition approaches the ordinary assimilation more and more in its
psychological character the more familiar the class to which the, perceived object
belongs, and the more it agrees with the general characteristics of the class. In equal
measure the [p. 241] feelings peculiar to the processes of cognition and recognition
decrease and finally disappear entirely, so that when we meet very familiar objects we do
not speak of a cognition at all. The process of cognition becomes evident only when the
assimilation is hindered in some way, either because the perception of the class of objects
in question has become unusual, or because the single object shows some unique
characteristics. In such a case the simultaneous association may become successive by
the separation of perception and cognition into two successive processes. Just in
proportion as this happens, we have a specific feeling of cognition which is indeed related
to the feeling of familiarity, but, as a result of the different conditions for the rise of the
two, differs from it, especially in its temporal course.
b. Memory-processes.
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY
139
18. Essentially different is the direction along which the simple process of recognition
develops, when the hindrances to immediate assimilation which give rise to the transition
from simultaneous to successive association are great enough, so that the ideational
elements which do not agree with the new perception unite -- either after the recognition
has taken place or even when there is no such recognition whatever -- to form a special
idea referred directly to an earlier impression. The process that arises under such
circumstances is a memory-process and the idea that is perceived is a memory-idea, or
memory-image.
18a. Memory-processes were the ones to which association-psychology generally limited
the application of the concept association. But, as has been shown, these are associations
that take place under especially complicated conditions. An understanding of the genesis
of association was thus rendered impossible from [p. 242] the first, and it is easy to see
that the doctrine accepted by the associationists is limited essentially to a logical rather
than a psychological classification of the different kinds of association that are to be
observed in memory-processes. A knowledge of these more complex processes is
possible, however, only through a study starting with the simpler associative processes,
for the ordinary simultaneous assimilations and simultaneous and successive recognitions
present themselves very naturally as the antecedents of memory-associations. But even
simultaneous recognition itself is nothing but an assimilation accompanied by a feeling
which comes from the unassimilated ideational elements obscurely present in
consciousness. In the second process these unassimilated elements serve to retard the
process, so that the recognition develops into the primitive form of successive
association. The impression is at first assimilated in the ordinary way, and then again in a
second act with an accompanying feeling of recognition which serves to indicate the
greater influence of certain reproduced elements. In this simple form of successive
association the two successive ideas are referred to one and the same object, the only
difference being that each time some different ideational and affective elements are
apperceived. With memory-associations the case is essentially different. Here the
heterogeneous elements of the earlier impressions predominate, and the first assimilation
of the impression is followed by the formation of an idea made up of elements of the
impression and also of those belonging, to earlier impressions, that are suitable for the
assimilation because of certain of their components. The more the heterogeneous
elements predominate, the more is the second idea different from the first, or, on the other [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl akte20.pev.pl
of assimilations and complications that leads to the success processes, is still more clearly
marked. Thus, the recognition of an object that has often been perceived is easier and,
therefore, as a rule an instantaneous process, which is also more like the ordinary
assimilation because the feeling of familiarity is much less intense. Sensible cognition
differs, generally but little from the recognition of single familiar objects. The logical
distinction between the two concepts consist in the fact that recognition means the
establishment of individual identity of the newly perceived with a formerly perceived
object, while cognition is the subsumption of object under a familiar concept. Still, there
is no real logical subsumption in a process of sensible cognition any more there is a fully
developed class-concept under which the subsumption could be made. The psychological
equivalent of such a subsumption is to be found in this case in the process of relating the
impression in question to an indefinitely large number of objects. This presupposes an
earlier perception of various objects which agree only in certain particular properties, so
that the process of cognition approaches the ordinary assimilation more and more in its
psychological character the more familiar the class to which the, perceived object
belongs, and the more it agrees with the general characteristics of the class. In equal
measure the [p. 241] feelings peculiar to the processes of cognition and recognition
decrease and finally disappear entirely, so that when we meet very familiar objects we do
not speak of a cognition at all. The process of cognition becomes evident only when the
assimilation is hindered in some way, either because the perception of the class of objects
in question has become unusual, or because the single object shows some unique
characteristics. In such a case the simultaneous association may become successive by
the separation of perception and cognition into two successive processes. Just in
proportion as this happens, we have a specific feeling of cognition which is indeed related
to the feeling of familiarity, but, as a result of the different conditions for the rise of the
two, differs from it, especially in its temporal course.
b. Memory-processes.
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY
139
18. Essentially different is the direction along which the simple process of recognition
develops, when the hindrances to immediate assimilation which give rise to the transition
from simultaneous to successive association are great enough, so that the ideational
elements which do not agree with the new perception unite -- either after the recognition
has taken place or even when there is no such recognition whatever -- to form a special
idea referred directly to an earlier impression. The process that arises under such
circumstances is a memory-process and the idea that is perceived is a memory-idea, or
memory-image.
18a. Memory-processes were the ones to which association-psychology generally limited
the application of the concept association. But, as has been shown, these are associations
that take place under especially complicated conditions. An understanding of the genesis
of association was thus rendered impossible from [p. 242] the first, and it is easy to see
that the doctrine accepted by the associationists is limited essentially to a logical rather
than a psychological classification of the different kinds of association that are to be
observed in memory-processes. A knowledge of these more complex processes is
possible, however, only through a study starting with the simpler associative processes,
for the ordinary simultaneous assimilations and simultaneous and successive recognitions
present themselves very naturally as the antecedents of memory-associations. But even
simultaneous recognition itself is nothing but an assimilation accompanied by a feeling
which comes from the unassimilated ideational elements obscurely present in
consciousness. In the second process these unassimilated elements serve to retard the
process, so that the recognition develops into the primitive form of successive
association. The impression is at first assimilated in the ordinary way, and then again in a
second act with an accompanying feeling of recognition which serves to indicate the
greater influence of certain reproduced elements. In this simple form of successive
association the two successive ideas are referred to one and the same object, the only
difference being that each time some different ideational and affective elements are
apperceived. With memory-associations the case is essentially different. Here the
heterogeneous elements of the earlier impressions predominate, and the first assimilation
of the impression is followed by the formation of an idea made up of elements of the
impression and also of those belonging, to earlier impressions, that are suitable for the
assimilation because of certain of their components. The more the heterogeneous
elements predominate, the more is the second idea different from the first, or, on the other [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]