[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
pabilities for some OOTW functions; and improving interagency co-
ordination. We must also ensure rapid reimbursement of DoD for
unplanned peace operations and OOTW to prevent readiness prob-
lems among forces not engaged.59
Thus the CORM, like PDD-25, noted the importance of peace opera-
tions to the greater national security in general. By differentiating them
as a special subcategory of MOOTW (a.k.a. OOTW), the CORM further
highlighted the important role the military had to play in conducting
them. Yet, although the military was encouraged to give [peace opera-
tions] greater prominence in contingency planning, no speci9 c
changes in force structure or doctrine were recommended. Moreover,
the remaining MOOTW missions were clearly considered the primary
responsibility both 9 nancially and in practice of other agencies.
The military would play a limited role, but the U.S. government was ex-
pected improve the capacity of other agencies to take over such tasks.
The subsequent failure to enhance these other agencies while at the
same time assigning them primary responsibility for these critical tasks
would have devastating consequences in Iraq and Afghanistan. As dis-
cussed in chapter 6, military planners believed that other experts in civil-
ian agencies would take care of the postcon: ict phase of the invasion. Of
course, practically no one showed up from these agencies because these
experts simply did not exist at least not with the capability and capacity
the military assumed.
Despite the lukewarm emphasis on peace operations suggested in the
somewhat schizophrenic CORM (or perhaps as a result of the CORM s
lukewarm, less-than-directive language), the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review and the 1997 National Military Strategy downplayed peace oper-
ations and reaf9 rmed the emphasis on 2-MTW. The QDR stated clearly,
U.S. forces must be capable of 9 ghting and winning two major theater
wars nearly simultaneously. 60 The Joint Chief of Staff s NMS followed
suit.
The military has an important role in engagement helping to shape
the international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a
more peaceful and stable world. The purpose of our Armed Forces,
59. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Report to Congress, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC, May
24, 1995).
60. QDR, 1997.
88 " lifting the fog of peace
however, is to deter and defeat threats of organized violence to our
country and its interests. While 9 ghting and winning two nearly si-
multaneous wars remains the foremost task, we must also respond to
a wide variety of other potential crises. As we take on these diverse
missions, it is important to emphasize the Armed Forces core com-
petence: we 9 ght. That must be the primary consideration in the de-
velopment and employment of forces.61
In light of the CORM and the well-articulated 2-MTW emphasis in na-
tional security and military strategy, the question turned to exactly how
the military was to prepare for peace operations while also staying pre-
pared for major theater war. On one end of the spectrum were those who
called for changes in force structure, perhaps even specialized units or
constabularies to carry out peace operations. On the other end were
those who still warned that soldiers ought not to conduct such missions
at all. As John Hillen warned, soft missions like peacekeeping would
degrade readiness and war9 ghting skills: When the time comes for
these soldiers to 9 ght again, the United States will learn a painful lesson:
Soldiers make good social workers, but social workers make lousy sol-
diers. 62 On this point, many military of9 cers who had actually con-
ducted peace operations disagreed.
Major General Bill Nash, commander of the First Armored Division
in the Balkans immediately following the Dayton Peace Accords, claimed
that his soldiers actually bene9 ted from their deployment: We found
that the improvements gained in dif9 cult battle staff and command skills
while in Bosnia far outweighed any losses in speci9 c war-9 ghting tasks
while deployed for peacekeeping . . . There is no doubt in my mind that
we were a much more capable, 9 ghting division after Bosnia than we
were when we went there. 63 For Nash, education of commanders is
more important than training lower-level troops.64 General Nash would
agree with Major General S. L. Arnold, commander of the 10th Moun-
tain Division force in Somalia, that well-trained, combat-ready, disci-
61. John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now:
A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997).
62. John Hillen, Playing Politics with the Military, Wall Street Journal, December 5,
1996. Ironically, as chapter 6 demonstrates, many of the skills these soldiers learned
preparing for and executing the long series of peace operations in the 1990s served them
well in Afghanistan and Iraq.
63. Major General Bill Nash and John Hillen, Can Soldiers Be Peacekeepers and War-
riors? NATO Review 49, no. 2 (2001), online edition.
64. General (Ret.) William Nash, USA, personal interview by the author, October
2003, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.
Vietnam to Iraq " 89
plined soldiers can adapt easily to peacekeeping or peace enforcement
missions. 65 Thus, no major changes to doctrine or training should be re-
quired.
Such opinions, combined with the strategic focus on 2-MTW, further
reinforced the big-war mind-set. If soldiers could so easily adapt during
peace operations and then spring back into war9 ghting shape upon re-
deployment, then little substantive institutional change would be
needed to accommodate these roles. Another report on roles and mis-
sions commissioned separately by the U.S. Army also articulated this
growing conventional wisdom by concluding, Forces should not be ear-
marked for peace operations nor should new forces be created. 66 In the
end, a de facto middle ground prevailed. No substantive changes were
made to force structure that could be said to speci9 cally target the re-
quirements of MOOTW, but neither were peace operations abandoned
as a role for U.S. military troops.67 By 1996, over 20,000 American mili-
tary members were conducting MOOTW around the world.68
As the tension between the 2-MTW strategy and the operational real-
ities continued, members of Congress began to question the readiness
of the U.S. military to conduct major theater war. Between 1995 and
1999, a series of reports from the General Accounting Of9 ce re: ected
the overall politicization of this issue.69 Each of these reports had a
slightly different research question, but all were designed to determine
the degree to which these nonstandard missions were affecting the abil-
65. Quoted in Wray Johnson, Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars (Bangkok:
White Lotus Press, 2001).
66. Vector Research, The 21st Century Army: Roles, Missions and Functions in an
Age of Information and Uncertainty (Ann Arbor, MI, 1995).
67. For an in-depth look at the struggle to change Army structure in the post Cold
War era, see Tammy Schultz, Ten Years Each Week: The Debate over American Force [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl akte20.pev.pl
pabilities for some OOTW functions; and improving interagency co-
ordination. We must also ensure rapid reimbursement of DoD for
unplanned peace operations and OOTW to prevent readiness prob-
lems among forces not engaged.59
Thus the CORM, like PDD-25, noted the importance of peace opera-
tions to the greater national security in general. By differentiating them
as a special subcategory of MOOTW (a.k.a. OOTW), the CORM further
highlighted the important role the military had to play in conducting
them. Yet, although the military was encouraged to give [peace opera-
tions] greater prominence in contingency planning, no speci9 c
changes in force structure or doctrine were recommended. Moreover,
the remaining MOOTW missions were clearly considered the primary
responsibility both 9 nancially and in practice of other agencies.
The military would play a limited role, but the U.S. government was ex-
pected improve the capacity of other agencies to take over such tasks.
The subsequent failure to enhance these other agencies while at the
same time assigning them primary responsibility for these critical tasks
would have devastating consequences in Iraq and Afghanistan. As dis-
cussed in chapter 6, military planners believed that other experts in civil-
ian agencies would take care of the postcon: ict phase of the invasion. Of
course, practically no one showed up from these agencies because these
experts simply did not exist at least not with the capability and capacity
the military assumed.
Despite the lukewarm emphasis on peace operations suggested in the
somewhat schizophrenic CORM (or perhaps as a result of the CORM s
lukewarm, less-than-directive language), the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review and the 1997 National Military Strategy downplayed peace oper-
ations and reaf9 rmed the emphasis on 2-MTW. The QDR stated clearly,
U.S. forces must be capable of 9 ghting and winning two major theater
wars nearly simultaneously. 60 The Joint Chief of Staff s NMS followed
suit.
The military has an important role in engagement helping to shape
the international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a
more peaceful and stable world. The purpose of our Armed Forces,
59. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Report to Congress, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC, May
24, 1995).
60. QDR, 1997.
88 " lifting the fog of peace
however, is to deter and defeat threats of organized violence to our
country and its interests. While 9 ghting and winning two nearly si-
multaneous wars remains the foremost task, we must also respond to
a wide variety of other potential crises. As we take on these diverse
missions, it is important to emphasize the Armed Forces core com-
petence: we 9 ght. That must be the primary consideration in the de-
velopment and employment of forces.61
In light of the CORM and the well-articulated 2-MTW emphasis in na-
tional security and military strategy, the question turned to exactly how
the military was to prepare for peace operations while also staying pre-
pared for major theater war. On one end of the spectrum were those who
called for changes in force structure, perhaps even specialized units or
constabularies to carry out peace operations. On the other end were
those who still warned that soldiers ought not to conduct such missions
at all. As John Hillen warned, soft missions like peacekeeping would
degrade readiness and war9 ghting skills: When the time comes for
these soldiers to 9 ght again, the United States will learn a painful lesson:
Soldiers make good social workers, but social workers make lousy sol-
diers. 62 On this point, many military of9 cers who had actually con-
ducted peace operations disagreed.
Major General Bill Nash, commander of the First Armored Division
in the Balkans immediately following the Dayton Peace Accords, claimed
that his soldiers actually bene9 ted from their deployment: We found
that the improvements gained in dif9 cult battle staff and command skills
while in Bosnia far outweighed any losses in speci9 c war-9 ghting tasks
while deployed for peacekeeping . . . There is no doubt in my mind that
we were a much more capable, 9 ghting division after Bosnia than we
were when we went there. 63 For Nash, education of commanders is
more important than training lower-level troops.64 General Nash would
agree with Major General S. L. Arnold, commander of the 10th Moun-
tain Division force in Somalia, that well-trained, combat-ready, disci-
61. John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now:
A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997).
62. John Hillen, Playing Politics with the Military, Wall Street Journal, December 5,
1996. Ironically, as chapter 6 demonstrates, many of the skills these soldiers learned
preparing for and executing the long series of peace operations in the 1990s served them
well in Afghanistan and Iraq.
63. Major General Bill Nash and John Hillen, Can Soldiers Be Peacekeepers and War-
riors? NATO Review 49, no. 2 (2001), online edition.
64. General (Ret.) William Nash, USA, personal interview by the author, October
2003, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.
Vietnam to Iraq " 89
plined soldiers can adapt easily to peacekeeping or peace enforcement
missions. 65 Thus, no major changes to doctrine or training should be re-
quired.
Such opinions, combined with the strategic focus on 2-MTW, further
reinforced the big-war mind-set. If soldiers could so easily adapt during
peace operations and then spring back into war9 ghting shape upon re-
deployment, then little substantive institutional change would be
needed to accommodate these roles. Another report on roles and mis-
sions commissioned separately by the U.S. Army also articulated this
growing conventional wisdom by concluding, Forces should not be ear-
marked for peace operations nor should new forces be created. 66 In the
end, a de facto middle ground prevailed. No substantive changes were
made to force structure that could be said to speci9 cally target the re-
quirements of MOOTW, but neither were peace operations abandoned
as a role for U.S. military troops.67 By 1996, over 20,000 American mili-
tary members were conducting MOOTW around the world.68
As the tension between the 2-MTW strategy and the operational real-
ities continued, members of Congress began to question the readiness
of the U.S. military to conduct major theater war. Between 1995 and
1999, a series of reports from the General Accounting Of9 ce re: ected
the overall politicization of this issue.69 Each of these reports had a
slightly different research question, but all were designed to determine
the degree to which these nonstandard missions were affecting the abil-
65. Quoted in Wray Johnson, Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars (Bangkok:
White Lotus Press, 2001).
66. Vector Research, The 21st Century Army: Roles, Missions and Functions in an
Age of Information and Uncertainty (Ann Arbor, MI, 1995).
67. For an in-depth look at the struggle to change Army structure in the post Cold
War era, see Tammy Schultz, Ten Years Each Week: The Debate over American Force [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]